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Abstract
This paper attempts to show the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy on Logical Positivism. In order to achieve this 
objective, we set out in the first half to examine Kant’s analysis of the nature, limits and conditions of our knowing 
process. Having established Kant’s position, the burden of the second half is precisely to explore and explicate the 
relationship between his system and the Logical Positivists. Most studies on the Positivists do not deal with the possibility 
of an influence exercised by Kant’s transcendental strategy. The more general reason has to do with the mistaken belief 
that a philosophical theory can be separated from the intellectual culture in which it is articulated. It has become 
fashionable to evaluate a philosophical position without taking into account either the roots of the idea in the history of 
philosophy or the way in which the position emerges within a system of thought. This is one reason why the most 
intriguing part of the twentieth century philosophy has not been understood – not enough attention has been paid to the 
indebtedness of the Positivists to the Kantian tradition. This work tries to correct the inadequacy of these studies by 
demonstrating that Kant indeed leaves a lasting influence on the Logical Positivists’ philosophy.
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Introduction
That a philosophical tradition influences culture and culture stimulates thought is consistent with the view that thought 
and culture are reciprocally causes and effects of each other. Such was David Hume’s revolutionary view against reason 
and nature to which Immanuel Kant’s critique was a response, which in turn became a great source of philosophical 
speculation for many other philosophers, notably the Logical Positivists. Their speculations were responding indirectly to 
the cultural factors that prevailed in Kant’s days. The history of philosophy since Kant is to a great extent the history of his 
influence; interpretation, transformation, critique and re-assessment of his ideas. To give an adequate account of Kant’s 
influence either positively, negatively or in the neutral sense (which only suggests his extra-ordinary importance) is to 
rewrite the history of post-Kantian philosophy. In him, as truly perhaps as in Descartes, philosophy made a new beginning 
such that most of those who came after him were influenced by one or more aspects of his teachings. It is remarkable 
that of all the historical figures in modern philosophical tradition, Kant has been the most influential in the West. A great 
number of the philosophical controversies of the late twentieth century can be greatly clarified only by a recognition and 
understanding of their Kantian origin. The Logical Positivists’ paradigm of two types of judgements – analytic (a priori) and 
synthetic (a posteriori) and their rejection of synthetic a priori judgement as established by Kant in the eighteenth century 
is one example. The second consideration is based on the verification criterion and metaphysics. Here, it is important to 
view the Verificationists’ epistemology in the light of this distinction that Kant had established. In advancing this, the 
Logical Positivists’ principle of verification is supposed to constitute the yardstick for determining whether a proposition is 
literally meaningful or not. For them, a simple way to formulate it is that a proposition has literal meaning if what it 
expresses was either analytic or empirically verifiable. In this, the Positivists’ problem against the metaphysician is not that 
they try unlike Kant to apply the categories of the understanding beyond the bounds of possible experience but because 
they produce sentences which do not conform to the test of being empirically verifiable. Kant equally rejects the 
metaphysicians for the same reason, accusing them of ignoring the conditions of knowledge in order to discover the limits 
of the human understanding, whereas the Logical Positivists accuse them of disobeying the rules that govern the limits of 
language in order to formulate a general criterion of its usage. The third historical thread that stands out especially 
significant connecting the Logical Positivists to the Kantian heritage that will be examined is the separation of science from 
religion. For them, there is an attempt to set up a world of value different from the world of possible experience. By so 
doing, the Positivists are seen as a continuation of the tendency that is characteristic of the philosophy of Kant. As we shall 
see, the reading that is to follow traces the very different ways in which Kant’s thoughts affected the Positivists. But 
before giving these essential details, let us begin with an analysis of his critical philosophy.
Kant’s critical philosophy
Kant, perhaps the greatest German philosopher of the modern period, was influenced by Martin Knutzen, a professor of 
logic and metaphysics at the University of Konigsberg, from whom he developed an interest in the philosophy of Christian 
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Wolff – a follower of Leibniz. During this period, Kant’s interest irrespective of his lectures on logic, mathematics and 
metaphysics, was in the external world. That was why he devoted much time to the relationship between metaphysics 
and the natural sciences that culminated in the publication of his Universal History of Nature and Theory of Heavens in 1755 
– a work in which he attempted to explain the structure of the universe using Newtonian physics. In 1760, Kant’s interest 
started moving into the outer limits and innermost nature of the cosmos; that is, the moral nature and knowledge of 
human beings. He started moving away from the traditional metaphysics of Descartes and Leibniz, in terms of what 
people know, to how people know or what conditions make ‘knowing’ possible. This movement was occasioned by his 
acquaintance with Hume’s work, which as it were awakened him from his rationalist ‘dogmatic slumber’ (Kant 1950:8). It 
must be emphasised that the seventeenth century rationalists had tried to formulate thoughts from their given stock of 
innate ideas where they attempted to deduce the knowledge of objects, while the eighteenth century empiricists had 
sought to present human knowledge as being derived solely from sense experience and induction. Hume, though an 
empiricist, stretches this process to its limits and shows that experience cannot provide any justification for the basic 
principle of causality. In his view, we psychologically assume that our impressions of contiguity, priority in time and space 
and constant conjunction do imply the existence of a necessary connection that supports the principle of causal necessity 
and its attendant negative consequences for objective scientific knowledge.
Being dissatisfied with rationalists’ tradition and the skepticism of Hume’s empiricism, Kant felt that both positions 
produced chaos and anarchy. His central project in the first Critique of 1781, therefore, is to bring order to human 
knowledge. In his view, there is no knowledge without reason and experience. Only in their synthesis do we make 
legitimate claims about the world. In order to formulate a novel conception of objectivity in knowledge which he calls 
transcendental or critical idealism, Kant agrees with the empiricists that all knowledge begins with experience. He raises 
an epistemic question which borders on metaphysics, namely: “Is there any knowledge that is independent of experience 
and even of all impressions of the senses? Such knowledge is entitled a priori and distinguished from empirical, which has 
its source a posteriori, that is in experience?” (1929:42-43). Kant is here asking whether there is something such as analytic 
or a priori judgement?
The expression ‘a priori’ does not however indicate with sufficient precision the full meaning of our question. 
For it has been customary to say even of such knowledge that it is derived from empirical sources, that we 
have it or are capable of having it a priori, meaning that we do not derive it immediately from experience but 
from a universal rule, a rule which is itself borrowed from experience (1929:43).
In doing this, Kant is pre-empting a viable condition for a meaningful discussion of a non-experiential being. Simply put, he 
is implying that metaphysics without epistemology is impossible. In the course of elaborating his theory, Kant introduces 
his dictum of dichotomy. According to him “… though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that 
it all arises out of experience” (1929:41). This statement can be explained from two logical concepts, namely necessary 
and sufficient conditions. A necessary condition is one without which a thing would not occur or exist, while a sufficient 
condition is one which when given, something else automatically exists or occurs. Kant’s dictum can be re-phrased in the 
light of the above logical explanation to mean that even if sense experience is a necessary condition of knowledge, it is not 
a sufficient condition. 
Against the contingency of empirical knowledge, Kant is of the opinion that there must be another kind of knowledge 
which is both necessary and absolutely universal. Such knowledge is necessary because it does not owe its validity to 
empirical verification. Its negation will always introduce a contradiction while it is universal because it holds for every 
place and every time. This kind of knowledge Kant calls analytic judgements. An analytic judgement is one in whose truth 
is guaranteed by the meaning that is discoverable through the analysis of the terms used. In Kant’s view, “… the 
connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity” (1929:48). Far from telling us anything new, 
analytic judgements logically entail what we already know. The “predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which 
is (covertly) contained in this concept A” (1929:48). Here too, some analysis of the above statement is necessary, 
otherwise one may through misunderstanding commit Kant to a logical error. It is on the level of ‘predicacy’ that he 
makes such an assertion. He is not saying that the predicate is contained in the subject as any object relates to its 
container. This would run him to a logical misappropriation because predicates are larger in extension than their subjects. 
His examples of analytic propositions include (i) “All bodies are extended”; “The whole is equal to itself”; “The whole is 
greater than its parts”; “A triangle has three angles”; “God is omnipotent” (1929:48, 54, 502); “Gold is a yellow metal”; 
“No bodies are unextended” (1950:14). When we say ‘Rose is a flower’, the concept of ‘flower’ is larger than the 
concept of ‘rose’. There is no logical method through which we can fit a larger entity into a smaller container. It is in this 
sense that Kant uses the word ‘covertly contained’ in a distributive way. In the example ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’, 
the predicate ‘unmarried man’ is distributed in the subject ‘bachelor’, while the subject ‘bachelor’ is related to the 
predicate ‘unmarried man’, in the same way. This is how the predicates in analytic judgements are ‘covertly contained’ in 
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their subjects or vice versa. Kant contrasts analytic judgements with synthetic judgements. In the latter type, the 
connection of the predicate with the subject “is thought without identity” (1929:48). Here, the predicate “B lies outside 
the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it” (1929:48). “All leaves are green” or “All bodies are 
heavy” (1929:49) is Kant’s example of a synthetic judgement. This means that the predicate ‘green’ does not necessarily 
characterise ‘all leaves’. It is quite unlike the relationship that exists between the subject and predicate in analytic 
judgement – ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’. In the second case, the concept of ‘bachelor’ is necessarily connected to 
the concept of ‘unmarriedness’ and adds nothing to the content of knowledge. But in the first case we are considering a 
predicate ‘green’ which is not necessarily connected to the subject ‘all leaves’. In synthetic judgements, therefore, the 
predicate is accidental to the subject and this extends our knowledge of the world (1950:14).
At this stage, Kant’s arguments rest on the general doctrine that the only meaningful propositions are essentially a 
priori, necessary or analytic truths or they are a posteriori, contingent or synthetic truths. On this dichotomy, Hume drew 
the conclusion that any metaphysical proposition must be meaningless since it would be either analytic or synthetic. Thus, 
from Hume it was already becoming apparent to Kant that empiricism denies the possibility of metaphysics while 
upholding the truths of mathematics and natural science (physics). Kant thought that the problem of the status of 
mathematics, natural science and metaphysics is central to his whole philosophical enterprise. In contrasting our 
knowledge of mathematics and natural science with metaphysics, Kant argues that the general claims of these disciplines 
are synthetic a priori judgements. He tells us that “in all theoretical sciences of pure reason, synthetic a priori judgements 
are contained as principles” (1929:52). It should noted, however, that Kant uses ‘judgement’, ‘knowledge’ and 
‘proposition’ interchangeably. His reason is that all knowledge is a product of judgement and all judgements are expressed 
in propositions or statements. He offers the most conspicuous examples in mathematics, namely the proposition 
“7+5=12” (1929:52) while the propositions “in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains 
unchanged” (1929:54) and “the world must have a first beginning” (1929:55) are examples of synthetic a priori principles 
in natural science and metaphysics respectively. In all these examples, Kant shows that the truths of these propositions are 
presupposed in the interpretation of experience. For each claim to be true, it would not refer to a particular time and 
place, but must be strictly universal and necessary. Thus, when Kant in the opening sections of the Critique asks the 
question “How are synthetic a priori judgements possible in mathematics, natural science and metaphysics?” he is in effect 
asking the question about the status of the general truths of these disciplines as synthetic a priori knowledge. For him, it is 
such truths as these that are required for the proof or defense of objectivity. In the ‘Aesthetic’ and ‘Analytic’, Kant is 
concerned to discover how this can be established in mathematics and natural science, while in the ‘Dialectic’ he shows 
the impossibility of its demonstration in metaphysics.
To investigate the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge in mathematics and natural science, Kant aims to show 
that these judgements define the necessary conditions of experience and by extension how objective knowledge of the 
world is possible. He argues that experience has a structure namely space and time which are intuited a priori. As the base 
for the formation of mathematical concepts, they are the representation of the form or necessary conditions of viewing 
appearances of objects as sensible intuitions in the mind. In this way, Kant’s problem is: Given a universe, how can we 
know it? In his view, when we make judgements about the world, the understanding (apart from space and time which 
are forms of sensible intuitions) brings the a priori categories of unity, causality, substance, necessity, existence, etc. to 
bear on our experience using these concepts in judgements. He contends that without the condition of sensible intuition 
that interplays with concepts or categories, the possibility of any object is incomprehensible. In a famous remark Kant 
says: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuition concepts are blind” (1929:93). He holds that because of the role of 
space and time and the categories (as a priori intuitions and concepts of pure understanding) which justifies them as valid 
laws that describe the workings of nature, our knowledge of objects within this formulation is synthesised as phenomenal 
(that is objects as they appear to us) to differentiate them from noumenal (objects as they are in themselves). Thus, when 
Kant says that objective judgement refer to objects to be true, he does not mean that they must refer to objects existing 
independently of the perceiver but of phenomenal ‘objects’ which “are nothing but mere representations of our 
sensibility” (1929:74). This is the idea that is compared to the Copernican revolution which reversed the traditional 
scientific belief of the sun orbiting the earth. In the same way, Kant (contrary to the claims of his predecessors) argues that 
the human mind acquires knowledge by imposing the a priori laws of the understanding upon experience. He gives the 
name ‘transcendental ideas’ to the concepts of pure reason just as he gives the name ‘categories’ to the concepts of pure 
understanding. The pure concepts of reason then, Kant contends, are necessary in so far as they set us the task of 
extending understanding as far as the unconditioned. It is important to note, however, that because such concepts arise 
from the very nature of reason, they have no corresponding empirical employment and so can have “… no other utility 
than that of … directing the understanding” (1929:316). Kant therefore calls the objective employment of pure concepts 
of reason ‘transcendent’, by which he means an employment extending or overlapping the limits of experience while the 
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employment of the pure concepts of understanding (the categories) he calls immanent, that is applying only to possible 
experience. 
In determining the scope and limits of knowledge, Kant speaks of metaphysics as “the battle-field of … endless 
controversies” (1929:7) and of his own aims as those of its “reform and restoration” (1929:8) by instituting “a tribunal 
which will assure to reason its lawful claims and dismiss all groundless pretensions” (1929:9). In exposing its lack of 
credentials in areas where it has no legitimacy, Kant tells us that the “… unavoidable dialectic of pure reason” (1929:300) 
occurs when the a priori categories of human understanding which are not meant to be used outside experience are 
objectively employed to apply to things in themselves. By so doing, the metaphysician is led to overstep the limits of 
possible experience to produce transcendental ideas as demonstrated in the illusion of speculative psychology 
(parallogism – fallacious syllogism about the self erroneously taken as object of knowledge). Similarly, when the 
metaphysician attempts to transcendentally investigate the world as he does in speculative cosmology, he is inevitably led 
to a ‘conflict’ of reason consisting of the antinomies (contradictory positions with theses and antitheses about the world 
on issues bordering on space and time, substance, causality and the idea of an absolute, necessary being as the cause of 
the world or its parts) and when he tries to inquire about the knowledge of God (speculative theology), the idea of pure 
reason is unavoidably involved in an illusory proof of God’s existence as if it is an object of experience. Kant believes that 
these illusions can be resolved once we realise that the legitimate theoretical function of reason is not to give us 
knowledge of the self, cosmos and God (because such transcendental entities or ideas which are not given to us in 
experience are beyond the power of minds to shape) but to serve as regulative guidelines of the way we think in 
providing a unity and coherent whole to human knowledge in our attempt to ask many unresolved metaphysical 
questions.
It is significant to note that Kant’s limitation of knowledge to the spatio-temporal realm was to understand our 
experience not only in the defense of scientific knowledge but also in the defense of moral and aesthetic values. In 
proposing a moral departure for religious beliefs, Kant claims that religion arises from our moral obligation as duty, as a 
rational necessity. For religion is nothing else than “the recognition of all duties as divine commands” (1996:156). In the 
absence of the moral law, Kant insists that man would never know himself to be free and without freedom morality is 
impossible. For man to be ethical, he has to be free. From this, Kant thus formulates the fundamental law of pure practical 
reason as (i) let your action be a universal law (ii) let men be treated as ends not as means. These laws are not man-made. 
They are categorical imperatives. Categorical because they are unconditioned, universal, objective and independent of 
human feelings; they are imperatives in the sense that they are experienced with a sense of duty, as an inner necessity 
occasioned by reason. They presumed or presupposed something religious – that is there is a law giver (a God) who 
guarantees their success. Obeying them requires the idea of justice by rewarding people according to their adherence or 
otherwise.
Kant and the Logical Positivists’ philosophy
A philosophical idea can impact on subsequent thought in the following ways, namely the positive sense in which case an 
idea may be fully assimilated in its entirety. One may also be wholly influenced by an idea in the negative sense but at the 
same time use the idea in different ways with different applications, while in the neutral sense one may be influenced by 
an idea but in the long run takes a completely radical departure by constantly reviewing the original position in order to 
reach an equilibrium. Peter Bodunrin once argued: 
It is often not realised that the influence of one philosopher over another is attested not only by the similarity 
of their thoughts but by their dissimilarity. The works of one philosopher may lead another to follow a 
different path, when we say he reacts against the former (1987:8).
It is in the above senses that the influence of Kant’s critical philosophy by the close of the eighteenth century gave an 
extra-ordinary impetus to the study of problems concerning the scope and limitations of human certitude. This influence 
was felt among the exponents of the traditional ‘philosophy of the schools’ such that the agenda for practically every 
philosophical movement during the nineteenth and late twentieth centuries were significantly refined, shaped and 
impacted by Kant . W. T. Jones lent credence to this when he observes that: 
Kant’s influence was too powerful … For a long time to come everyone (including the Logical Positivists) 
thought not only in his terms, but largely in his vocabulary … and … found reasons for developing his 
thoughts in a different direction … (1952: 101). 
The term ‘Positivism’ was first used by Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) to describe the use of scientific method in 
sociology and philosophy. Through Auguste Comte (1778-1857), the school became a great philosophical movement in 
the Western world during the second half of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century. For them, 
science is the only valid knowledge and as such philosophy should not possess a method different from science’s. 
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Positivism abandons any alleged knowledge that goes beyond experience and any method of investigation other than the 
scientific method. In his conception of a positive science of society, Comte for example confines himself to the concept of 
experience and demands the removal of all metaphysical elements from science by being resolutely opposed to the a 
priori speculations of the German idealists like Kant and the neo-Kantians – G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), J.G. Fichte (1762-
1814), F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854), L. Feuerbach (1804-1872), etc. This tradition resulted in the anti-metaphysical 
posture of empirical positivists like J.S. Mill (1806-1875), R. Avenarius (1834-1896), Ernest Mach (1838-1916), etc. whose 
doctrines according to W.H. Walsh were that “science is fundamentally the description of experience” (1967:52). Thus, it 
is safe to say that Positivism as it may be is rigidly ‘empiricist’ in the eyes of it exponents. As a radical projection of the 
British empirical tradition, its most direct influence could be traced to Hume’s and particularly Kant’s rejection of 
speculative metaphysics. With such a powerful influence, the Positivists developing Kant’s ideas along different lines began 
to see in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the writings and teachings of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell the bedrock for 
building their philosophical enterprise. In that work, Wittgenstein had said, “what can be said at all can be said clearly; and 
whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” (1999:27) and hence to the effect that “philosophy is not a body of 
doctrines but an activity” (1999:4.112). This remark of Wittgenstein coupled with Moore and Russell’s insistence that the 
task of philosophy is merely to make clear what it is that we know and how we know it when we assert propositions to 
be true that greatly influenced the spread of the Positivists’ philosophy.
Consequently, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, a group of eminent scientists and intellectuals – A. J. Ayer, 
Rudolf Carnap, Phillip Frank, Frederick Waismann, Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, Herbert Freigl, Kurt Godel, Victor Kraft 
and Felix Kaufmann under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, a physicist, converged in Vienna to reconstruct philosophical 
thinking and proposed a consistently methodological perspective. Although the intellectual background of these great 
minds varied, their strongest common interest was not only on how to confront and resolve the hitherto philosophical 
problem of traditional speculative philosophy as a description of ultimate reality but also a continuous radical reaction 
against speculative German metaphysics and system building. The philosophy of this group which later came to be known 
as the ‘Vienna Circle’ was also referred to as ‘Logical Positivism’, ‘Logical Neo-positivism’, ‘Logical Empiricism’, 
‘Consistent Empiricism’ and ‘Scientific Empiricism’. 
… the members of the Vienna circle moved away from Kant owing to their professed empiricism, they did 
nonetheless adopt the Kantian project of founding science on an unshakable basis in another form that drew 
them nearer to Hume and in particular, to a more modern current of thought … (Delacampagne 1999:96).
In brief, this Kantian and Modern perspectives could be found in the unification of science attainable through the unity of 
language (precisely the language of physics), the conspiracy against metaphysics in all its disguised forms and the total 
indifference to ethical concepts. According to Robert Martin, the Positivists “discard all the overblown wooly pretentious 
nonsense that had passed as philosophy for centuries” (2001:7). Thus, like Kant, their aspiration to rebuild the 
foundations of philosophy were committed to a scientific conception of the world that could find meaningful expression 
in all areas of life. In Ayer’ own words, he says:
One of the principle aims of the Vienna Circle was to rebuild the bridge between philosophy and science 
which had been largely broken by the romantic movement and the accompanying rise of idealist metaphysics 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, its members saw the future of philosophy as consisting, 
once the fight against metaphysics had been won, in the development of what they called the logic of science 
(1977:129).
In the Logical Positivists’ conception of the logic of science, the use of the syntax of scientific language was to play a 
fundamental role in this venture only if it meets the requirements of clarification of concepts by means of logical analysis. 
It is in this recourse to the systematic pursuit of clearness, logical precision and the rigorous intellectual commitment to 
grapple with the problem of meaning that Gustav Bergmann tells us how a clever Englishman once proposed the equation 
that “Logical Positivism is Hume plus mathematical logic” (1954:33). 
Analytic and synthetic dichotomy
Kant’s influence on the Logical Positivists’ philosophy presents itself first in two main ideas which form the heart of his 
system. These are (i) the recognition that all forms of logical and deductive reasoning as a whole are analytic, in which 
case they elucidate the meaning of words such that their predicates are contained in their subject terms, but yield no new 
knowledge about the world, while (ii) all empirical propositions are synthetic, in which case their predicates are not parts 
of the subject terms, but add new information that expands our knowledge of the world. As we have seen in our analysis 
of the critical philosophy, Kant’s classification of judgement into analytic and synthetic propositions has a long history from 
antiquity. While some notions of the a priori and a posteriori were contained in Aristotle’s philosophy in the Ancient 
period, St. Thomas Aquinas, Boethius and others in the medieval period defined ‘self-evident’ (analytic) propositions as 
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those in which the predicate terms are contained in the subject terms. This agrees with the claims of the rationalists that 
all truths are analytic in contrast to the claims of the empiricists who think all truths are synthetic. Leibniz and Hume for 
example took over the distinctions between ‘truths of reason’ and ‘truths of fact’ and relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of 
fact’ respectively. By Kant’s time, the term analytic had come to mean propositions which are found in the analysis of their 
subject concepts. They are therefore a priori knowledge, independent of experience, while synthetic propositions are a 
posteriori because their truths cannot be established by the analysis of their subject concepts but have to be learnt from 
observation and experience.
By drawing a similar distinction between these two concepts, the Positivists “preserve(d) the logical import of Kant’s 
distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions” (Ayer 1952:78). According to them:
… we say that a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it 
contains and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience. Thus, the proposition 
‘There are ants which have established a system of slavery’ is a synthetic proposition. For we cannot tell 
whether it is true or false merely by considering the definitions of the symbols which constitute it. We have to 
resort to actual observation of the behaviour of ants. On the other hand, the proposition ‘Either some ants 
are parasitic or none are’ is an analytic proposition. For one need not resort to observation to discover that 
there either are or are not ants which are parasitic. If one knows what is the function of the words ‘either’ 
‘or’ and ‘not’ then one can see that any proposition of the form ‘Either P is true or P is not true’ is valid, 
independently of experience. Accordingly, all such propositions are analytic. It is to be noticed that the 
proposition ‘Either some ants are parasitic or none are’ provides no information whatsoever about the 
behaviour of ants or any matter of fact. And this applies to all analytic propositions. None of them provide any 
information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of factual content … It is for 
this reason that no experience can confute them (Ayer 1952:78-79).
In the same way, Carnap also argues that:
(Meaningful) statements are divided into the following kinds. First there are statements, which are true solely 
by virtue of their form (‘tautologies’ according to Wittgenstein; they correspond approximately to Kant’s 
‘analytic judgements’). They say nothing about reality. The formulae of logic and mathematics are of this kind. 
They are not themselves factual statements but serve for the transformation of such statements. Secondly, 
there are the negations of such statements (‘contradictions’). They are self-contradictory, hence false by 
virtue of their form. With respect to all other statements, the decision about truth or falsehood lies in the 
protocol sentences. They are therefore (true or false) empirical statements and belong to the domain of 
empirical science (1978:76).
Following the above position, the Logical Positivists openly declare their derivation from Kant of the view that every 
significant or meaningful proposition must be either analytic (a priori) or synthetic (a posteriori or empirical) whose 
usefulness or significance is to provide us with a clarifying picture of our knowledge. Yet, while Kant introduced the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements as a way of establishing the limits of knowledge, the Positivists on 
the other hand subscribe to the view that linguistic expression could be exhausted by a similar distinction. This implies for 
the Logical Positivists a rejection of Kant’s third classes of judgement, the synthetic a priori propositions. According to 
Kant, it is the demonstration of such truths as these that are required for the proof of objective empirical science. Thus, 
the problems of objectivity and synthetic a priori knowledge in Kant are ultimately connected. This view is discussed 
extensively in one of the most famous sections of the Prolegomena titled “Second Part of the Main Transcendental 
Problem” (1929:28ff) where he tries to show the possibility of a pure science of nature consisting of propositions that are 
synthetic a priori in the sense that objects of experience must of necessity conform to certain a priori conditions. For the 
Logical Positivists, there is no such a thing as synthetic a priori truths as demonstrated by Kant in the foundations of 
mathematics and natural science. In fact, it is precisely in the rejection of the possibility of (Kant’s) synthetic knowledge a 
priori that the basic thesis of modern empiricism lies” (Sarkar (ed.) 1996:330).
The verification criterion and metaphysics
With the classification of meaningful propositions into an analytic-synthetic distinction and the rejection of the synthetic a 
priori type stemming from the Kantian tradition (that we cannot make sense of the claim to understand the world beyond 
our experience), the Logical Positivists were led to the formulation of a criterion for determining the meaningfulness of 
propositions. This criterion which was henceforth and collectively referred to as the ‘verifiability principle’ (VP) saw the 
declaration of war “not only on classical metaphysics – with strict reference to the systems of the scholastics and German 
idealism – but also the veiled metaphysics of Kantian and modern a priorism” (Carnap et al. 1966:485). (Though, unlike 
the Positivists’, Kant in the dialectic never rejected all forms of metaphysics. What he rejected was the rationalist 
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dogmatic metaphysics of the traditional type). The main impetus in the formulation of this fundamental principle was the 
search for meaning. According to Ayer, “the principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be 
determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful” (1952:5). As was originally conceived by members of the 
Vienna Circle, the Verifiability Principle was expressed as saying that “the meaning of a proposition is its method of 
verification” (Schick 1968:443). Ayer contends that:
A sentence is factually significant to any given person, if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition, 
which it purports to express – that is if he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions 
to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false (1952:35).
The underlying import of the verification criterion was that there are no abstract universal or a priori principles, no 
presumptions of a general kind whether these are philosophical or theoretical. For them, everything must be reduced to 
the ‘given’ of experience by being inter-subjectively testable. By formulating this precise criterion of verification, the 
Logical Positivists hope to make possible a strict scientific discussion of all philosophical questions.
Among the Positivists there was no agreement as to the nature of the verifiability principle itself. While some insist that 
it should be completely verified, ‘practical verifiability’ (‘direct’ or the ‘strong sense’), others accept that it is enough to be 
verifiable in principle (‘indirect’ or the ‘weak sense’). A proposition is said to have a direct method of verification when it 
asserts something about an experience which can be effectively tested or verified by immediate perception. For example, 
if we say ‘it is raining’. This is verified by our present experience. Whereas an indirect method of verification is employed 
when the proposition cannot be verified directly through one’s immediate perception. For example, the proposition that 
‘the earth revolves round the sun in 365 days’ is not directly or immediately verifiable (practical verifiability) but it is 
indirectly verifiable (verifiable in principle) because we can find some means of going out of our planet to verify the 
movements of bodies. But this statement is at least verifiable in principle. This means that even if we cannot at the 
present time verify the proposition, we can at least describe the conditions under which this verification is possible. 
Carnap argues that the direct and indirect methods of verification are very crucial in scientific investigation because they 
assert something either about our present or future experiences. Against this backdrop, speculative metaphysics 
according to the Logical Positivists fails to meet their criterion of meaning and therefore all writings purporting to deal 
with supra-sensible and transcendental realities were regarded as the production of nonsense. In Ayer’s words, 
We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence, which purports to express a genuine 
proposition but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and 
empirical hypothesis form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified in concluding that all 
metaphysical assertions are nonsensical (1952:41).
Within the Vienna Circle itself, Schlick had earlier published an article entitled “Experience, Cognition and 
Metaphysics” in 1926 in which he argues that the pretensions of the metaphysicians to have knowledge in the 
transcendent sense is impossible because this involves a contradiction. In his view, the metaphysician could have 
knowledge of his experience by enriching life through poetry and the works of art. But once he attempts to absolutely 
experience the transcendent, he is confronted by contradictions that confuse the art of living with the notion of 
knowledge and truth; thereby chasing empty shadows (1979:110-111). In the Positivists’ view, “the traditional disputes of 
philosophers are for the most part unwarranted as they are unfruitful” (Ayer 1952:33). They advocate as a solution the 
determination of the purpose and method of a philosophical inquiry; and proceed along the Kantian intellectual legacy to 
reject the metaphysical thesis that “philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and 
common sense” (Ayer 1952:33). For Ayer, “it is possible for us to be … metaphysician(s) without believing in a 
transcendental reality” (1952:33). Metaphysical assertions arise as a result of “the commission of logical errors (in our 
linguistic usage) rather than to a conscious desire on the part of their authors to go beyond the limits of experience” 
(Ayer, 1952:33). These logical errors are due to the fact of distinguishing a thing from its sensory properties such that 
when we ascribe properties to a thing, we invariably assert that it exists. In this way, we cannot according to the 
Positivists validly move from the evidence of the senses to arrive at the conception of a transcendental reality. In their 
submission, “… from the empirical premises nothing whatsoever concerning the properties or even the existence of 
anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred” (1952:33). Interestingly, this implies that there is no logical warrant 
to transit from the empirical to the non-empirical and to venture into the world of transcendence is logically unjustified. In 
their views, metaphysicians “who raise questions about Being … based on the assumption that existence is an attribute 
are guilty of following grammar beyond the boundaries of sense” (Ayer 1952:43).
Carnap also argues that the application of the verifiability principle to metaphysics proves that it is non-verifiable and 
that if any effort is expended on verification, the product or result is always negative. He posits that “many words of 
metaphysics … (are) devoid of meaning” (Ayer (ed.),1978:65). He goes on to illustrate this with the term principle (in the 
sense of principle of being, not principle of knowledge or axiom). Carnap observes that “various metaphysicians offer an 
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answer to the question which is the (highest) ‘principle’ of the world” (Ayer ed., 1978:65), in terms of water, number 
motion, etc. In showing the meaning of the term ‘principle’ in the above metaphysical question, he contends that:
We must ask the metaphysician under what conditions a statement of the form ‘X’ is the principle of ‘Y’ 
would be true and what conditions it would be false. In other words; we ask for the criteria of application or 
for the definition of the world ‘principle’ (Ayer ed., 1978:65).
Carnap posits that for this question the metaphysician would reply that “ ‘X’ is the principle of ‘Y’ is to mean ‘Y’ arises out 
of ‘X’, the being of ‘Y’ rests on the being of ‘X’, ‘Y’ exists by virtue of ‘X’ and so forth” (Ayer ed., 65). Carnap believes 
that these words are imprecise and ambiguous. He says:
Frequently they have a clear meaning (when) for example, we say of a thing or process ‘Y’ that it ‘arises out of 
‘X’ frequently or invariably followed by things or processes of kind ‘Y’ (causal connection in the sense of a 
lawful successions). But the metaphysician tells us that he does not mean this empirically observable 
relationship (Ayer ed., 1978:65). 
The metaphysicians, according to Carnap, cannot resist the attempt of making their propositions non-verifiable 
because if they do, then they would be merely empirical propositions belonging to the domain of empirical science whose 
truth or falsehood would be based on experience. Carnap equally observes that “the expression ‘arising from’ is not to 
mean here a relation of temporal and causal sequence which is what the word ordinarily means. Yet, no criterion is 
specified by the metaphysician for any other meaning” (Ayer ed., 1978:65). Carnap therefore contends that “the alleged 
‘metaphysical’ meaning which the word is opposed to have here in contrast to the mentioned empirical meaning does not 
exist” (Ayer ed., 1978:65). In the same vein, Carnap gave instances of metaphysically meaningless expressions for which 
no empirical criterion can be given. These are “the idea”, “the being of being”, “non-infinite”, “nothingness”, “the cause 
of the word”, “thing-in-itself”, “absolute spirit”, “objective spirit”, “essence”, “being-in-itself”, “being-in-and-for-itself” 
“emanation”, “manifestation”, “articulation”, “the Ego”, “the non-Ego” and so on. By drawing an analysis, Carnap submits 
that “meaningful metaphysical statements are impossible. This follows from the task which metaphysics sets itself: to 
discover and formulate a kind of knowledge, which is not accessible to empirical science” (Ayer ed., 1978:76). At best, 
they contain ideas that are in part poetic and in part religious. In Carnap’s words “metaphysics is the inadequate means 
for the expression of the basic attitudes … towards life” (Ayer ed., 1978:79); yet they do not have the capacity to do so in 
an adequate way through the creation of works of art. He argues that “metaphysicians are musicians without musical 
ability” (Ayer ed., 1978:80) who “… have a strong inclination to work within the medium of the theoretical to connect 
concepts and thoughts” (Ayer ed., 1978:80). In doing this, they thus make use of the language of science in which they 
express inadequately their experience of the world (by producing a structure which achieves nothing for knowledge) as 
compared to the works of art and ‘the attitude towards life’. On this ground, Carnap vehemently expresses the Logical 
Positivists’ view this way:
Metaphysical propositions are neither true nor false because they assert nothing, they contain neither 
knowledge nor error, they lie completely outside the field of knowledge, of theory, outside the discussion of 
truth or falsehood. But they are, like laughing, lyrics and music expressive. They express not so much 
temporary feelings as permanent emotional or volitional disposition … The danger lies in the deceptive 
character of metaphysics, it gives the illusion of knowledge without actually giving any knowledge. This is the 
reason why we reject it (1935:19).
Admittedly, the Positivists agree with Kant on the rejection of metaphysics as a science. Both accept the contention 
that the scientific status of metaphysics is not attainable because the statements made by the metaphysicians are not 
‘testable’ by any experience. Yet, there is a decisive difference between them. For the Logical Positivists, metaphysical 
statements as ‘a matter of logic’ are literally insignificant. They simply do not pass the test of verification and as such they 
are meaningless or non-sensical. For Kant, metaphysical assertions as ‘a matter of fact’ lacked epistemological credentials 
in not being empirically verifiable. His argument is that though we have no right to assume the existence of metaphysical 
objects (as noumena or things in themselves) because they are not objects of possible experience, we equally, unlike the 
Logical Positivists, have no right to deny them. For Kant, the problem of metaphysics is the natural and unavoidable 
disposition in man to transcend the spheres of the phenomenon world to the things in themselves as noumena which are 
not objects of knowledge. In this way, Kant’s philosophy stood at the dividing line between two worlds. His attempt to 
save metaphysics in the (i) limited sense of a system of metaphysical (synthetic a priori) propositions or foundation of the 
empirical sciences which he termed the principles of pure natural science and (ii) the human mind’s natural disposition to 
it were completely rejected by the Positivists who had no problem in limiting knowledge to the ‘given’. It is however 
worth reminding ourselves here that this view of the Logical Positivists had its origin in Kant.
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Science and non-science
The distinction between science and non-science represents the third major influence of Kant on the Verificationists. In 
our analysis of the critical philosophy, we have seen how Kant argued that an objective science of nature is possible only 
within the realms of our experience. In Kant’s articulation, our knowledge of the objective world is a joint product of the 
rational or conceptual through the forms of sensibility.This means that every object of knowledge is subject to the forms 
of space and time and must have a sensuous content that is determinable by the concepts or categories of the mind. On 
the contrary, when we try in the same way to know the ultimate reality as if they are objects of experience, we become 
involved in the dialectic of pure reason (i.e. the paralogisms, the antinomies and the ideals of reason in the defence of 
God’s existence) which are illusions, taking the transcendental ideas as things in the themselves. Kant is convinced that we 
can only grasp the ultimate nature of things through ethics and aesthetics (that is our experiences of moral obligation, the 
beautiful and purposefulness of nature). He is determined to defend the integrity of science and moral experience and 
hence the distinction between science (facts) and values (ethics, aesthetics and religion). Kant’s earlier consideration 
shows that there are transcendental objects whose concepts as he says cannot be produced by our experience. They are 
distinct from phenomena (appearances) whose existence constitutes our experiences of objects. He tells us that even if 
we cannot know the noumena as they are in themselves, we can at least believe through the use of practical reason the 
necessity and reality of freedom, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as products of pure reason that are 
useful for the moral life of man and society. His denial of knowledge in order to make room for faith in his system further 
reinforces this fact. Some scholars however think that Kant would have expressed his mind in a better way if he had said 
that he was limiting scientific knowledge so as to carve a place for the appreciation of values (Jones 1952:68, Lawhead 
2002:345).
In Kantian terms, the same can be said of the Logical Positivist model of scientific knowledge. They acknowledge 
Kant’s claims that there is no knowledge without the mental activity of the subject (the knower) to form concepts of our 
experience of the world. Both Kant and the Positivists agree that in asking questions about the real nature of things, 
science is not able to tell us anything about the nature of reality but proceeds to limit knowledge to the phenomenal 
world of our experience. In Kant, however, there is the realisation that the active constructive powers of the mind, as a 
set of cognitive activities governed by concepts or rules of the understanding which are logically presupposed by any 
experience in the act of making judgements about phenomenal objects external to it, has an essential role in shaping the 
content of our knowledge and the meaning of the world. The Positivist doctrine of concept formation on the contrary 
exhibits a reversal of Kant’s epistemological revolution comparable to the famous Copernican turn such that we begin to 
have the idea of a world that conforms to the nature of our concepts. For them, concepts are the original atomic sense 
data (copies, ‘images’, ‘sensations’, ‘impressions’ or abstractions) of objects perceived through the senses and passively 
interpreted by the mind. They are the mental representations or ‘possessions’ of the individuals which correspond or 
conform to something in our experience of the external world. Given the Positivists’ interpretation of the world, the 
crucial question becomes “how it is possible for example to show … that one’s person’s experience is identical with 
another’s … an experience based science is fundamentally subjective; science is verified only at the cost of losing its 
objectivity” (Edward ed., 1967:55). This is clearly because two individuals can disagree on the colour of a thing due to 
differences in their physiological and psychological disposition and the relative position of the object of experience. Kant, 
however parts ways with the Positivists in this regard. His emphasis on the a priori categories of the human understanding 
as the universal, necessary conditions of knowledge seems to provide a resolution of the question of objectivity in 
science.
A further consequence of the verifiability principle for the Logical Positivists is that ethics, aesthetics, religion, etc. are 
not scientifically defensible. For them, assertions about values fall within the realm of metaphysics and were therefore 
regarded as meaningless. Ayer and Carnap argue that ethical assertions based on the principle of verification lacked 
factual content. They are not assertions at all. “The existence of ethical and aesthetics as branches of speculative 
knowledge presents an insuperable objection to our radical empiricist thesis” (Ayer, 1952:102). Values and morality are 
without reality and meaning. To make a judgement of ethical values about ‘the wrongness of stealing’ for example is not, 
they suggest, to convey empirical information about stealing which can be either true or false, but that such judgement 
expresses our feeling of disapproval. Ayer argues:
If I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money’ I am not stating anything more than if I had 
simply said, ‘You stole that money’. In adding that this action is wrong, I am not making any further statement 
about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said ‘you stole that money’ in a 
peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks. The tone or the 
exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the 
expression of it is attended by certain feeling (of moral disapproval) in the speaker (1952:107).
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In this particular example, there is an attempt to dissuade others from stealing. The disposition is to evoke an emotional 
reaction. Thus, Ayer contends that “in every case in which one would commonly be said to be making an ethical 
judgement, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely ‘emotive’. It is used to express feeling about certain objects, 
but not to make any assertion about them” (Ayer, 1952:108).
Similarly, Ayer tells us that “aesthetic words such as ‘beautiful’ and ‘hideous’ are employed … not to make statements of 
fact, but simply to express certain feelings and evoke a certain response” (1952:113). Like ethics, aesthetic judgements 
according to the Positivists have no ‘objective validity’. They do not say that a particular aesthetic object has value.What 
they communicate is that the person who makes the judgement has certain feelings (emotions). In distinguishing the 
Positivist moral concepts from that of the Kantian project, Ayer concludes that:
Any attempt to make our use of ethical and aesthetic concepts the basis of metaphysical theory concerning 
the existence of a world of values, as distinct from the world of facts, involves a false analysis of these 
concepts. Our own analysis has shown that the phenomena of moral experience cannot fairly be used to 
support any rationalist or metaphysical doctrine whatsoever. In particular, they cannot as Kant hoped be used 
to establish the existence of a transcendent god (1952:114).
In the same way, the Positivists reject religious truths on the grounds that the propositions which the theists use to 
communicate such ‘truths’ are not testable by any experience. ‘If God is a metaphysical term,’ says Ayer, ‘then he belongs 
to a reality which transcends the world of sense experience.’ Such terms cannot be true or false. They come under the 
blanket rejection of metaphysical assertions.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Logical Positivists stress or derive the need for a clear or complete distinction 
between science (facts) and non-science (religious and moral values) as two distinct fields of inquiry.
There is (according to the Positivists) no logical ground for antagonism between religion and … science. As 
far as the question of truth or falsehood is concerned, there is no opposition between the … scientist and the 
theist who believes in a transcendent god ... since the religious utterances of the theist are not genuine 
propositions of science. Such antagonism as there is between religion and science appears to consist in the 
fact that science takes away one of the motives which make men religious. For it is acknowledge that one of 
the ultimate sources of religious feeling lies in the inability of men to determine their own destiny and science 
tends to destroy the feeling of awe with which men regard an alien world, by making them believe that they 
can understand and anticipate the course of natural phenomena and even to some extent control it (Ayer, 
1952:117).
The resolution of the glaring distinction by the Positivists between science and non-science in conformity with the 
Kantian paradigm rules out the possibility of any conflict between them. Both schools of thought believe intensely in the 
separate spheres of these disciplines and the tireless concern to preserve their independence, characteristics and 
functions which stem from their objects of knowledge constitute and pervade Kant and the Positivists’ system. For them, 
the object of scientific knowledge is on the perceptible, physical world of concrete existence while religious beliefs are 
about our moral life which relates us to a transcendental God. For the Positivists such a Kantian belief in God is totally 
meaningless. 
Conclusion
Our examination of the critical philosophy has shown Kant as the last modern practitioner of foundationalist epistemology 
in the Cartesian tradition – a tradition which he recognised and at the same time rejected – saw the major problem of the 
history of knowledge as one of providing a metaphysical account of the way in which the subjective contents of individual 
minds come to have indubitable objective reference. He is also the inaugurator of a very different approach to 
epistemology – one that sees methodology or rules of cognitive procedure as fundamental in determining the objectivity 
of knowledge. While the standard view shows no relationship between Kant’s system and the Positivists of the Vienna 
Circle, a careful study has shown that the same claim can no longer be made about them. In fact, the Positivists’ general 
characteristic was the replacement of previous philosophical speculation with the scientific ways of thinking that 
guarantee the role of reason and the constraints of experience as Kant did. As was to be expected, this work has 
established that Kant’s ideas fitted well (though with some disagreements) into the debate of the latter as evident in the 
epistemological and semantic context. The fact of Kant’s influence on the thoughts of the Positivists is uncontested. He 
has more in common with late twentieth century philosophers than with his traditionalist eighteenth century 
predecessors. The Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell, the ‘Vienna Circle’ Logical Positivism, Williard Van Quine and 
Ordinary Language Philosophy for example could be viewed as extensions of Kant’s criticisms of dogmatic metaphysics. 
In locating the nature of Kant’s influence specifically on the Logical Positivists, we have seen that they derived valuable 
and legitimate reference to Kant in their philosophical debate. These include the clear cut distinction between analytic 
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and synthetic statements and by implication the recognition of the rational (the purely conceptual) and the empirical (the 
existential) elements in creating the objects of knowledge. The others being the verification criterion which saw all forms 
of metaphysics as falling into the realm of nonsense because it could not be reconstructed on a strictly empirical basis and 
the subsequent division between science and non-science. A dominant theme of the entire work is the demonstration a la
Kant that for anything to be objectively valid in the epistemic sense, it must have a corresponding reference in the world 
of experience. Even the Positivists accept this. The failure to see this connection often hidden in the background has 
resulted in the failure to appreciate the importance of Kant’s doctrine for the Verificationists. Graham Bird acknowledges 
the relevance of Kant within the context of twentieth century philosophy when he says “… though any current lessons 
from Kant may seem relatively inexplicitly …, still the influence of Kant’s philosophy is considerable and undisputed” 
(1962:127). His general mode of thought and contributions to subsequent philosophical thinking has been immense, such 
that his work in anticipating the ideas of the Verificationists, particularly in the areas which we have delineated, cannot be 
easily underestimated.
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